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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘That’s the way it is with women. They don’t read about the news. They often make it,’ 
feminist writer Meridel Le Sueur exulted in 1939.1 This statement proved particularly accurate 
during World War II, Meghan Winchell writes, as women made ‘their usually private work 
visible’ while rendering ‘unpaid yet vital services as mothers and sweethearts to the state and 
the military.’2 Scholarly work has long discussed how equivocal the domestic propaganda 
message towards women in the U.S. was, oscillating between an invitation to join the workforce 
as part of their patriotic duty and an ambiguous promise following their contribution to the war 
effort, especially on the issue of employment.3 Towards the end of the war, U.S. women 
experienced a return to domesticity, quickly challenged by the development of an important 
network of military bases across the world. Overseas, women fuelled what Malia McAndrew 
identifies as a policy of ‘gendered interventionism’4 towards local populations, promoting 
aesthetic standards in order to contain the spread of communism. As Mire Koikari notes in the 
case of Japan, U.S. military outposts also used women as agents of modernization, pushing 
 
1 Meridel Le Sueur, ‘Women Know a Lot of Things’, Daniela Gioseffi (ed.), Women on War. An International 
Anthology of Writings from Antiquity to the Present (New York, 2003), 322-6 at 323. 
2 Meghan K. Winchell, Good Girls, Good Food, Good Fun: The Story of USO Hostesses during World War II 
(Chapel Hill NC, 2008), 13-43. 
3 On women’s role in U.S. wartime propaganda, see: James J. Kimble, ‘The Home as Battlefront: Femininity, 
Gendered Spheres, and the 1943 Women in National Service Campaign,’ Women's Studies in Communication 
34:1 (2011), 84-103; Leila J. Rupp, Mobilizing Women for War: German and American Propaganda, 1939-1945 
(Princeton, 1978); Maureen Honey, Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda During World 
War II (Amherst, 1984); D’Ann Campbell, Women at War with America: Private Lives in a Patriotic Era 
(Cambridge, 1984); Jean Gallagher, The World Wars through the Female Gaze (Carbondale, 1998). On the 
specific issue of employment, see: Bilge Yesil, ‘“Who Said This Is a Man's War?” Propaganda, Advertising 
Discourse and the Representation of War Worker Women During the Second World War’, Media History, 10:2 
(2004), 103-17. 
4 Malia McAndrew, ‘Beauty, Soft Power, and the Politics of Womanhood during the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 
1945–1952,’ Journal of Women's History, 26:4 (2014), 83-107, at 85. 
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democratic ideals through a ‘politics of feminine affinity.’5 The traditional role of ‘diplomatic 
wives’ and ‘army wives’6, as explored by Molly Wood and Donna Alvah, would certainly have 
a bright future in the Cold War. 
Yet, in an age when foreign policy makers had been resorting to ‘personal/political 
relationships entailing intimacy, sexuality, trust, and secrecy’ to structure relations of power, 
as Frank Costigliola argues, women’s wartime experience had a particular bearing on the Cold 
War.7 Also, a national security state emerged in 1947, as Congress approved the creation of the 
National Security Agency, the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency; 
three years later, the top-secret NSC-68 policy paper ‘paved the way for the most 
comprehensive rearmament programme the United States had ever undertaken in time of 
peace.’8 Together, they marked a turning point in the Cold War, raising ‘great anxiety and much 
admonition on gender and sexuality matters.’9 Caught up in the struggle for Europe, women 
cooperated with intelligence and military agencies, and assumed greater responsibilities in 
information networks overseas: they emerged as a vehicle for Truman’s containment policy to 
present ‘freedom,’ ‘independence’ and ‘self-enterprise’ as the hallmarks of American 
modernity.10 However, carefully chosen words and meticulously managed advertisement 
strategies ‘acted as both consumers and producers of modern culture, heralding the benefits of 
modernity even as they contemplated the perils of mid-twentieth-century life.’11 In 
consequence, women living in overseas military bases became the subject of a discourse about 
modernity, as they were confined to the traditional roles of wives and mothers. I contend that 
‘modernity’ not only fuelled the patriotic slogan of the American Century, but also partook in 
women’s larger mission to defend national security from abroad through the correlation of ‘the 
promise of peace and the American way’.12 
 
5 Mire Koikari, ‘Cultivating Feminine Affinity: Women, Domesticity, and Cold War Transnationality in the U.S. 
Military Occupation of Okinawa,’ Journal of Women’s History 27:4 (2015), 112-36, at 118. 
6 On the question of ‘diplomatic wives,’ see: Molly Wood, ‘Diplomatic Wives: The Politics of Domesticity and 
the “Social Game” in the US Foreign Service, 1905-1941,’ Journal of Women’s History 17:2 (2005), 142–65. 
On the topic of ‘army wives,’ see: Donna Alvah, Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas 
and the Cold War (New York, 2007). 
7 Frank Costigliola, ‘Pamela Churchill, Wartime London, and the Making of the Special Relationship,’ 
Diplomatic History 36:4 (2012), 753-62, at 761. See also Robert Dean’s commentary in the same issue of the 
journal: ‘The Personal and the Political: Gender and Sexuality in Diplomatic History,’ Diplomatic History 36:4 
(2012), 763-7. 
8 Beatrice Heuser, ‘NSC 68 and the Soviet threat: A new perspective on Western threat perception and policy 
making,’ Review of International Studies 17:1 (1991), 17-40, at 17. 
9 Geoffrey S. Smith, ‘Security, Gender and the Historical Process,’ Diplomatic History 18:1 (1994), 79-90, at 85. 
10 On the issue of women in post-World War II intelligence activities, see Helen Laville’s work, in particular: 
Cold War Women: The International Activities of American Women's Organisations (Manchester, 2002); ‘The 
Memorial Day Statement: Women's Organizations in the ‘Peace Offensive,’ Intelligence and National Security 
18:2 (2003), 192-210; ‘The committee of correspondence: CIA funding of women's groups 1952–1967,’ 
Intelligence and National Security 12:1 (1997), 104-121. See also: Amy J. Martin, ‘America’s Evolution of 
Women and Their Roles in the Intelligence Community,’ Journal of Strategic Security 8:5 (2015), 99-109; Brent 
Durbin, ‘Addressing “This Woeful Imbalance”: Efforts to Improve Women's Representation at CIA, 1947–
2014,’ Intelligence and National Security 30:6, 855-70. 
11 Dennis Merril, ‘The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity,’ Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 36: 1 (2006), 27-37, at 34. 
12 Tony Smith, ‘Making the World Safe for Democracy in the American Century,’ Diplomatic History 23:2 
(1999), 173-88, at 173. 
Version finale auteur – Author final draft – 2019 
 3 
This article investigates women’s role in ‘selling’ the U.S. peace hegemon in France, 
home to a nexus of U.S.-driven international agencies, both military and civilian, in the first 
half of the Cold War. As a modern, industrial country, the U.S. had been promoting the 
‘American Century’, a form of pioneering slogan supported by public and private media. It was 
articulated in 1941 by press mogul Henry R. Luce and helped to spark the shift from traditional 
American protectionism to a new global orthodoxy of internationalism.13 Having deployed an 
army of soldiers and diplomats overseas during and after World War II, the US was ‘frequently 
invited to play the kind of great-power role it did’.14 Women had a pivotal influence in forging 
the US ‘empire by invitation,’ especially in France, where transatlantic economic and cultural 
exchanges had been sustained before the twentieth century, and had persisted despite the 
ideological differences brought about by communism. France stood in the forefront of the U.S. 
‘pointillist empire,’ composed of overseas bases that ‘act as staging grounds for … economic, 
military, and cultural’ influence.15 Military bases soon became ambivalent outposts for the 
American Century, underlining the link between security and prosperity in the Atlantic world, 
and revealing the modern role of women in defending U.S. national security from abroad.16 
 
 
A DOMESTIC DOUBLE ENTENDRE? 
 
Women’s contribution to the defence of U.S. national security was not the result of 
benign development. Their role in espionage activities, dating from the Civil War, had a 
profound and long-term effect on the portrayal of women in the press.17 This image evolved 
slowly during World War I, but remained subject to ‘gender occupational segregation,’ as Mary 
Nolan remarks.18 The lack of gender destabilization in the U.S. led to a significant decline in 
wartime women’s contribution as workers, favouring the perspective of the elite class on the 
issue of war and gender representation. Indeed, the ‘glamorised popular image that elite women 
helped to define was a powerful force, shaping and influencing the context of all women’s 
wartime service.’19 Elite women, mostly military and diplomatic wives, became the proponents 
of a discourse grounded in their personal dispositions, advertising progress from the margins 
of their social class. Commonly confined to traditional gender roles, women embodied 
 
13 Stephen J. Whitfield, ‘The American Century of Henry R. Luce’, Revue LISA/LISA e-journal (2004) (Media, 
culture, histoire, La Deuxième Guerre mondiale, http://lisa.revues.org/917; accessed on 13 September 2016). 
14 Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire by invitation' in the American century,’ Diplomatic History 23:2 (1999), 189-217, at 
190. 
15 Daniel Immerwahr, ‘The Greater United States: Territory and Empire in U.S. History,’ Diplomatic History 
40:3 (2016), 373-91, at 390. 
16 On the notion of ‘outposts,’ see: Brooke L. Blower, ‘Nation of Outposts: Forts, Factories, Bases, and the 
Making of American Power,’ Diplomatic History 41:3 (2017), 439–459. 
17 On the question of women spies since the mid-nineteenth century, see: Elizabeth D. Leonard, All the Daring of 
the Soldier: Women of the Civil War Armies (New York, 1999); H. Donald Winkler, Stealing Secrets: how a few 
daring women deceived generals, impacted battles, and altered the course of the Civil War (Naperville, 2010); 
Karen Abbott, Liar, Temptress, Soldier, Spy: Four Women Undercover in the Civil War (New York, 2014); 
Joseph Gollomb, ‘Spies of the Civil War: An Account of Belle Boyd and Other Girl Spies of the Civil War’, Los 
Angeles Times (4 November 1928). 
18 Mary Nolan, The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890-2010 (Cambridge, 2012), 60-1. 
19 Susan Zeiger, In Uncle Sam's Service: Women Workers with the American Expeditionary Force, 1917-1919 
(Ithaca NY, 1999), 2-3. 
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America’s moral values overseas, which developed through a narrative promoting U.S. 
internationalism and reached a wide audience in political, economic and military circles.20 
However, the almost entire suppression of the image of women workers in the press until World 
War II, when U.S. propaganda revolved around the well-known figure of Rosie the Riveter, 
raises broader questions when it comes to women’s platforms for expression. 
Indeed, press magnates seized the opportunity to become active participants in the war 
effort in the 1940s and provided their female readership a forum for discussion. Voicing their 
opinion on war, women advocated greater involvement of the United States in Europe, ‘as a 
return for the cooperation which the French have shown for many years.’21 They were also very 
active in philanthropic organizations, in which they defended the war as a means to safeguard 
democracy. In 1942, it was up to the U.S. government and advertising companies to call women 
to arms. In an essay entitled Women for Defense,22 Margaret Culkin Banning praised the 
strength of American democratic principles, while novelist Keith Aylin reminded her 
readership of the fact that not everyone ‘ha[d] to wear a uniform’ to support the war effort.23 
But the streamlined, dynamic and modern image of the American way of life pushed by the 
U.S. government did not prevent the French from ‘harbour[ing] a host of false notions about 
their American sisters,’ and by 1949, ‘they believe[d], for example, that all housework here is 
accomplished with push-button electricity, and that every woman [in America] owns an 
automobile.’24 Placed in the framework of the American Century, women were the primary 
target of U.S. propaganda on the domestic front; they embraced the gender responsibilities of 
the internationalist movement, woven into the fabric of the economic and political elite class. 
Moreover, these women played a decisive part in the projection of U.S. culture overseas, 
through initiatives that initially consisted in celebrating major American women. One example 
is Eleanor Roosevelt, who ‘played a major role in further spreading pacifist ideals and merging 
them with the promotion of social reforms and human rights’.25 In World War II, a large number 
of women’s organizations engaged in democracy promotion overseas, departing from the ‘long 
tradition of using their supposed greater interest in peace as the basis for their claim to an 
increased political role’.26 Conversely, ‘women’s participation in labour force was not 
motivated by self-actualization or self-reliance, but by patriotism and the desire to win the 
approval of men,’27 reinforcing gendered expectations about their contribution in the war. 
 
20 Leila J. Rupp, Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement (Princeton, 1998). 
21 ‘University Women Study War Crisis,’ The New York Times (14 June 1940), 19. 
22 Margaret F. Culkin Banning, Women for Defense: An Appraisal (New York, 1942). 
23 Keith Ayling, Calling All Women (New York, London, 1942), 177; quoted in Melissa McEuen, Making War, 
Making Women: Femininity and Duty on the American Home Front, 1941-1945 (Athens GA, 2011), 180. 
Calling All Women is a book published by Harper & Brothers, whose chairman, A. Cass Canfield, was in charge 
of the United States Information Services (USIS) in Paris in 1945. It shows the interdependence between the 
government, private media and advertisement companies in the U.S. 
24 Genevieve Reynolds, ‘“They Think We All Have ’Em: French Women Dream of Living in Home Like You 
Dream About”’, The Washington Post (8 April 1949), 2. 
25 Dario Fazzi, Eleanor Roosevelt and the Anti-Nuclear Movement (New York, 2016), 12. 
26 Helen Laville, ‘The Memorial Day Statement: Women's Organizations in the “Peace Offensive”’, Intelligence 
and National Security 18:2 (2003), 192-210, at 192. See also: Jennifer M. Proffitt, ‘War, Peace, and Free Radio: 
The Women's National Radio Committee's Efforts to Promote Democracy, 1939–1946,’ Journal of Radio & 
Audio Media 17:1 (2010), 2-17. 
27 "'Who Said This Is a Man's War?',’ 108. On the question of Hollywood’s coverage of women’s contribution 
during the Second World War, see: Philippa Gates, ‘Home Sweet Home Front Women: Adapting Women for 
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Meanwhile, as the Office of War Information forcefully repeated the story of women who took 
up jobs as factory workers as an act of patriotism, the Office of Strategic Services recruited 
female agents to perform operative functions in intelligence activities at home.28 After World 
War II, the U.S. government’s interest in women resided in the fact that they had been confined 
to a liminal space, which, with the setting up of military bases overseas, had become 
instrumental to formulate and support a narrative after 1947 that has been called ‘the cult of 
national security.’29 
Elaine Tyler May, who underlines the connection between domesticity and ‘the internal 
and external factors that influence foreign policy,’ writes about how ‘gendered domestic images 
provid[ed] the meaning of patriotism and the reason to fight.’30 As advocates of peace strongly 
opposed to nuclear armament, wives of U.S. diplomats gained prominence within the North 
Atlantic organization in Paris, because of their capacity to informally advocate the safeguarding 
of the U.S. national security through a structural ‘homology,’ as Pierre Bourdieu described the 
contingency between social status and cultural practices.31 ‘NATO wives’, the wives of civilian 
or military U.S. officials of NATO, aimed at strengthening modernity as the inherent and 
dominant feature of Western capitalism; they had the wherewithal to build ties with wives from 
representatives of other countries. But in spite of the Marshall Plan and due to widespread 
scepticism towards information programmes, very few public diplomacy operations advertised 
NATO to the non-elite class.32 However, the debate intensified as the military build-up of 
Western Europe brought up the fear of nuclear armament stockpiled on U.S. military bases in 
France, against which the Communists protested repeatedly, putting the bases’ security in 
jeopardy. As many other informal actors of US public diplomacy, NATO wives invested 
considerable effort in ensuring that the U.S. anti-communist position was understood within 
elite circles in France, as the press, radio and cinema tried to bring awareness to public opinion 
at home about the bases as borderlands. 
 
Hollywood's World War II Home-Front Films,’ Americana: the Journal of American Popular Culture 15:2 
(2016) (americanpopularculture.com/journal/articles/fall_2016/gates.htm; accessed 16 December 2018). 
28 On the topic of the Office of War Information, see: John E. Moser, ’Gigantic Engines of Propaganda: The 
1941 Senate Investigation of Hollywood,’ Historian 63:4 (2001), 731-52. 
29 Andrew J. Bacevich, The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II 
(New York, 2007), ix. 
30 Elaine Tyler May, ‘Ideology and Foreign Policy: Culture and Gender in Diplomatic History,’ Diplomatic 
History 18:1 (1994), 71-8, at 71, 76. 
31 On the issue of ‘structural homology’, see: Pierre Bourdieu, La Distinction: Critique sociale du jugement 
(Paris, 1979); Philippe Coulangeon, Yannick Lemel, ‘The Homology Thesis: Distinction Revisited,’ Karen 
Robson, Chris Sanders (eds), Quantifying Theory: Pierre Bourdieu (Dordrecht, 2009); Olivier Roueff, ‘Les 
homologies structurales: une magie sociale sans magiciens? La place des intermédiaires dans la fabrique des 
valeurs,’ Philippe Coulangeon (ed.), Trente ans après La Distinction, de Pierre Bourdieu (Paris, 2013), 153-64. 
32 On the question of the Marshall Plan, see: Brian A. McKenzie. Remaking France: Americanization, Public 
Diplomacy and the Marshall Plan (New York, 2005); Richard Pells. Not Like Us. How Europeans Have Loved, 
Hated, And Transformed American Culture Since World War II (New York, 1997). On the issue of U.S. 
propaganda and the military build-up in NATO, see: Matteo Lodevole, ‘The Western Communists and the 
European military build-up, 1949–1950: A preventive strategy,’ Cold War History 10:2 (2010), 203-28; Linda 
Risso, ‘A Difficult Compromise: British and American Plans for a Common Anti-Communist Propaganda 
Response in Western Europe, 1948–58,’ Intelligence and National Security 26:2-3 (2011), 330-54; Linda Risso, 
‘Propaganda on wheels: The NATO travelling exhibitions in the 1950s and 1960s,’ Cold War History 11:1 
(2011), 9-25. 
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However, women had yet to play a role in the public diplomacy network in Cold War 
France. In 1950, art historian Darthea Speyer served as cultural attaché in the Paris embassy, 
but was assigned the task to ‘look after women's activities,’ which entailed organising ‘lectures, 
being in contact with people – nothing to do with art.’33 Head of the U.S. Information Services 
(USIS-France) in Paris, William R. Tyler was aware of women’s importance to forge 
relationships with the French. They were part of a greater strategy, which, he wrote to 
Washington later that year, aimed to carry ‘the message that the engagements which the United 
States and France have undertaken together – under the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact 
with their implementing organizations such as ECA, NATO, and SHAPE – are truly in the 
highest common interest.’34 And yet, Janet Flanner from The New Yorker was first to report on 
the all-out ‘battle of the mind, in enlightened self-interest,’35 that followed the arrival of 
NATO’s military command (SHAPE) in Fontainebleau. USIS-France followed up a year later, 
‘encourag[ing] French attitudes toward understanding and sympathy for presence of US troops 
on French soil’.36 However, the military in France ‘established a rhetorical space which would 
be dominated by the concept of occupation’37 and emphasize ‘Americanization.’ Women 
seemed to be of secondary importance to U.S. public diplomacy services, albeit to a lesser 
extent when placed within the framework of the media-driven American Century. 
Throughout the 1950s, U.S. civilian and military officials involved with NATO flocked 
to Paris, where the organization had established its headquarters in 1952, with their wives and 
children. The U.S. State Department sponsored the NATO Information Service (NATIS) from 
its early days, providing funds and propaganda material.38 Wives of military and civilian 
officers serving in NATO had a dual purpose. First, ‘information posts abroad identified women 
as a special target audience,’ and targeted those ‘in positions to act as channels for political 
information’.39 Second, women often contributed to intelligence activities, which were ‘kept 
entirely distinct from overt foreign information activities of other US government agencies.’40 
But as General Alfred Gruenther explained to the ministers of the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) in December 1954, NATIS lacked purpose, which fuelled civil-military disagreement 
more than it promoted internationalism.41 Trying not to overstep political boundaries, he urged 
 
33 Darthea Speyer, Oral History Interview for the Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution, interview 
by Paul Cummings (28 June 1976) (www.aaa.si.edu/collections/oralhistories/tranSCRIPTs/speyer76.htm; 
accessed 9 February 2017). 
34 ‘Informational Work and Cultural Relations (United States Information and Education Exchange - USIE)’, 
National Archives at College Park, MD: RG84, ‘General and Classified Subjects of the USIA office’, UD2462, 
box 27, 1 October 1951, 1. 
35 Janet Flanner, ‘Letter from SHAPE,’ The New Yorker, October 27, 1951, 122. 
36 Charles K. Moffly, ‘Description and Assessment of US Information Services in France,’ (NACP: RG84, 
‘General and Classified Subjects of the USIA office,’ UD2462, box 11, 1 October 1952), 7. 
37 Hilary Footit, ‘American forces in France: Communist representations of US deployment,’ Cold War History 
11:1 (2011), 85-98, at 88. 
38 Linda Risso, Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War: The NATO Information Service (London, 2014), 
74. 
39 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence 
KS, 2006), 261. 
40 David A. Rudgers, ‘The Origins of Covert Action,’ Journal of Contemporary History 35:2 (2000), 249-62, at 
253. 
41 Alfred M. Gruenther, ‘Statement by General Gruenther at NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 17, 1954’ 
AC/87-D/6, NATO Archives (1955), 13-5. 
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them to take action and validate a programme to specify, from the top down, the relations 
between American servicemen and the French population. The integrity of U.S. military bases 
made them enclosed geographical spaces, bastions of liberal internationalism, whose security 
had been threatened by Communist opposition in provincial France.42 Gruenther believed 
women could nonetheless be exploited for political gain. 
Americans who were struggling to coordinate the information activities in NATIS had 
neither the leverage nor the intention to push for a programme on the issue of women. However, 
the gap with the local population was widening, and the situation regarding military wives in 
provincial France became increasingly disquieting. Women lived an insular life, pushed to the 
margins of both the world of the NATO civil-military elites in Paris and the local communities 
throughout France. Well aware the French had developed a ‘psychosis of occupation’, military 
wives were therefore encouraged to take the path of social exclusivity throughout the whole 
period: 
 
Large general receptions, offered by the American ladies, allow for a first very cordial 
encounter; they are followed by small meetings, carefully prepared by the French ladies, where 
a limited number of French women invite an equal number of American women. Then, each 
French woman invites an American woman, takes an interest in her, ‘adopts’ her, in a sense. In 
this way, many Americans were able to experience traditional French family life.43 
 
Hoping to ‘transform the sad and boring exile of American women’ into ‘an encounter with the 
virtues and latent forces of France,’44 the French Liaison Mission claimed that there could be 
‘no peace in this world so long as they remain indifferent to the happiness of the children of 
others.’45 In this case, motherhood helped support interventionism by containing warfare, 
showing how women, caught up in domesticity and steeped in tradition and morality, were 
considered as a conduit to safeguard U.S. national security through moral righteousness. This 
domestic double entendre turned social clubs on U.S. military bases into not only private spaces 
created to stave off boredom, but also public outposts of U.S. internationalism placed under 
official patronage of its military establishment. 
 
 
US WIVES’ CLUBS IN FRANCE AND THE SECURITY-PROSPERITY ETHOS 
 
The debate over Western rearmament in the 1950s brought about a renewed interest in 
national security rhetoric, and with it a broader stimulation of women.46 Exposing women to 
the political culture of the U.S. was a strategy developed throughout the Cold War to ‘convert’ 
 
42 Alvah explains Eisenhower’s history of lending an ear to servicemen’s wives; Unofficial Ambassadors, 21-9. 
43 ‘Concours de lecture et de prononciation française, organisé à l’intention des écoles américaines et 
canadiennes en France par le ministère de l’Education nationale et la Mission Centrale de Liaison pour 
l’Assistance Aux Armées Alliées,’ Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France, box GR-12 Q 127 
(March 1965), 3-4. 
44 Ibid., 5. 
45 Ibid., 1. 
46 The section heading refers to William O. Walker, ‘Henry R. Luce and the Security Ethos’, in Walker, The Rise 
and Decline of the American Century (Ithaca, 2018) 1-14, at 1. 
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a pre-existing inclination into a potential asset favourable to the United States. As David Snyder 
demonstrates, women were an essential target of public diplomacy operations that went beyond 
the ‘Cold War kitchen’ issue.47 On the receiving end, they gave rise to a number of questions 
about politics, race and class in the United States. NATO wives, who sat at the nexus of public 
and private circles in Paris, were thus of primary importance to defuse criticism within official 
circles and to legitimize the polished image of the United States overseas. In the case of the 
Netherlands, Snyder writes, the U.S. experienced ‘a failure to reach Dutch women via direct 
contact,’ although ‘women’s organizations were well-organized and active.’48 But a few 
hundred miles away, in France, U.S. army wives succeeded in their endeavour, setting up 
officers’ wives’ clubs to maintain an active social life within as well as outside the military 
base. Exclusively dedicated to women’s social engagement, this space was nevertheless entirely 
driven by gender, socio-economic and diplomatic-related concerns. In other words, under the 
auspices of the military establishment, these clubs were allowed to thrive. 
At a time when U.S. civil-military relations were strained, governed by suspicion rather 
than by self-interest, the State Department became another indirect actor of women’s 
experiences in provincial France. The European Defence Community (EDC) had entered very 
lengthy debates and by 1954, there remained little hope for the creation of a European army. 
Thus, Leslie S. Brady, the new chief public affairs officer in Paris, set out a vision for USIS-
France's general policy. On 2 February 1954 he submitted a proposal to Theodore C. Streibert, 
director of the recently-formed U.S. Information Agency in Washington D.C. Determined to 
contribute to the needs of the military establishment, Streibert immediately dispatched an 
economic and security specialist, Nedville E. Nordness, to Paris. On 10 March, Brady and 
Nordness submitted four guiding principles of U.S. public diplomacy in France, revolving 
around the themes of ‘European integration’, ‘Western alliance’, ‘common heritage’ and 
‘economic democracy.’49 These principles gave implicit directions to the public information 
office at the Central Liaison Mission, a bilateral civil-military office designed to expose the 
motives of the U.S. army in France, deal with the daily issues and debunk the anti-U.S. 
propaganda vented by the Communists. While Brady’s vision opened the door to a shift in civil-
military initiatives, it also integrated army wives’ activities into the U.S. public diplomacy 
programmes. 
This does not mean that State Department officials intervened in Army wives’ clubs in 
any way, but rather shows a convergence of interests. The first club in France was established 
in 1951 in the headquarters of the U.S. Army Communication Zone (Com-Z), situated in 
Orléans, in the central Loire valley region. By 1955, the US Air Force and US Army sponsored 
no fewer than twenty-three wives’ clubs across the country, an expansion due to the growing 
number of military bases.50 On 8 March of that year, army wives travelled to Paris to participate 
in the first meeting of the American Women's Association in France (AWAF), which took place 
 
47 David J. Snyder, ‘Domesticity, Rearmament, and the Limits of U.S. Public Diplomacy to the Netherlands 
during the Early Cold War,’ Journal of Cold War Studies 15:3 (2013), 47-75. 
48 Ibid., p. 66. 
49 Leslie S. Brady, ‘New Country Plan for USIS/F’ (March 10, 1954), NARA, RG 84, UD 2462 box 40, 1-4. 
50 A map of all US military installations is available in Olivier Pottier, Les Bases américaines en France, 1950-
1967 (Paris, 2003), 89. 
Version finale auteur – Author final draft – 2019 
 9 
in the Paris office of the international organization of the Women’s World Fellowship.51 The 
AWAF President, a Ms. Diedeker, ‘had the sum of $100, a generous donation from the Officers’ 
Wives Club of Orléans, to finance the organization.’52 Initially set up to provide humanitarian 
relief to war-affected populations, women worked towards people-to-people contacts with their 
French counterparts. According to a later report on U.S. women’s activities in the NATO era, 
this group sought ‘to establish a mutual understanding of the opportunities and problems arising 
from the presence in France of women's clubs and … to advise the clubs in their activities and 
efforts toward constant improvement of Franco-American relations.’53 Women were vectors of 
identity and cultural values fitting the pattern of nineteenth-century U.S. missionary ventures. 
At first sight, officers’ wives’ clubs had a traditional approach to interpersonal contacts. 
Despite the instrumental role they played to improve women’s morale and their aspiration to 
figure as a cultural podium, they functioned within the channels of civilian and military 
diplomacy. But as a place of socialization, the club allowed for limited contacts with local 
French women. According to the head of the French public information office at the Central 
Liaison Mission, traditional activities, such as ‘an afternoon tea with French and American 
ladies’,54 were the best way to protect moral values, revealing a strategy similar to the one used 
at NATO. Army wives recruited participants among their peers, leaving to the wife of the 
Prefect the duty to select French women, thus encouraging exclusivity and structural homology. 
U.S. army wives thereby helped mediate an outcome that both satisfied the U.S. Cold War 
foreign policy promoting economic prosperity and offered guarantees for domestic and 
international security. On the other hand, French and American women had grown accustomed 
to one another by the end of the 1950s, engaging in a unique experience at Com-Z in Orléans: 
the Franco-American Women’s Club (FAWC), a locally-run, binational initiative entirely 
designed and almost exclusively managed by its own members, half of whom were wives of 
the US Army officers stationed at Com-Z. It is through this social framework of the military 
that U.S. army wives brought a smattering of non-military French wives to experience a wind 
of change, albeit within traditional boundaries. 
As a local initiative, the FAWC was virtually unknown until its archival records were 
uncovered half a century later, in 2012. Composed of an unpublished handmade scrapbook and 
newspaper clippings, it allows us to observe how public diplomacy methods and procedures 
crossed the border wall of the base into the local community, and in return, the effects it had on 
the modernization of the social links in a small French city and its surroundings during the Cold 
War. Owned by the family of the first French co-president of the FAWC, the records are not 
 
51 An explanation of the nature and purpose of the WWF was provided by the vice-president in the Washington 
Post: ‘The Women’s World Fellowship, which aims to rally women of all nations to work for the protection of 
individual freedom and peace, was organized in Paris in 1945. It invited women leaders to an International 
Assembly for Women in Paris last September. Representative non-Communist women leaders from 51 nations 
gathered at the assembly, including 25 from United States. The recommendations adopted there have been 
presented to U.N. agencies. They have served to guide and stimulate women’s activities in many countries.’ 
Ernestine Perry, ‘Women's World Fellowship Sets Up U.N. Welcome Service,’ The Washington Post (22 
September 1948), 7. 
52 ‘Activités Féminines Américaines en France,’ Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France, box GR-
12 Q 125, 8 February 1966, 2. 
53 Ibid. 
54 MCLAAA, ‘Lettre aux Préfets portant sur la création d’un “thé franco-américain de dames”,’ Service 
Historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France, box GR-12 Q 125, 9 April 1957, 1. 
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open to the public (which also explains the absence of an official repository in the references). 
The reason for my interest in the FAWC is its structural modernity, granting its members a 
sense of class hedonism while remaining outside the reach of U.S. public diplomacy control. A 
typical example of entertainment and family activities, it advocated strict gender roles in a club 
that exposed the interrelatedness of domesticity with the challenge of projecting a positive 
image of the United States to support domestic security. The club offered exactly what the army 
needed at the time, boosting the morale of Army wives and keeping them on a war footing 
without seeming to do so. However, the FAWC had a very different approach to women’s place 
in the traditional framework of army wives’ clubs: not only did the Army allow its members to 
evolve in a culturally hybrid environment, it enabled them to experience the specific challenge 
of evolving inside and outside public diplomacy patronage. 
Indeed, the FAWC of Orléans is a compelling example of the penetration of the U.S. 
social and recreational club model in a local French community of women. Founded by two 
long-time friends – Alice Fallen, a woman of French origin who married a colonel of the U.S. 
Army, and Micheline Deschamps, a 35-year-old French member the local bourgeoisie – the 
FAWC had the support from the wives of Com-Z Commander-in-Chief, general Edward J. 
O’Neill and the Prefect of the Loiret region, Robert Holveck. Fallen and Deschamps agreed to 
sponsor ‘a club whose aim would be to encourage a spirit of friendship and promote relations 
between the women of these two nations.’55 In an interview with Deschamps, she eloquently 
declared that they built a ‘social gathering club to promote mutual understanding between the 
two peoples.’56 This rhetorical statement echoes the efforts of U.S. Com-Z to shape and respond 
to a new model of public diplomacy. Indeed, the FAWC of Orléans adopted club statutes and 
relied on military authorities to fund cultural and social activities. The French members, who 
came from privileged social positions, were an asset to its development; among them were 
wives of a Senator, several doctors, a Michelin factory owner, a few civil engineers, insurance 
agents, a rector (school director) , a chief education officer, the head of the Banque de France 
in Orléans and several senior French army officials. The club had a substantial budget and 
enjoyed wide popularity among local middle and upper-class residents. There were of course 
no communists.  
Modelled after the traditional U.S. civilian club, the FAWC offered a unique 
opportunity for French wives to participate in the planning of cultural and recreational activities 
organized at the prestigious Château de La Mothe. The nature of women’s activities, which 
included a fashion show, a contest for the best home-made hat, a pastry-making contest and an 
afternoon with the French-American singer Eddie Constantine, is best illustrated by a Christmas 
dinner dance, which revealed the club’s traditional nature as well as a prescribed pattern of 
social exclusivity. Indeed, SFC Weatherby ‘and his country gentlemen’ rallied women to dance 
to songs from a traditionally Southern musical repertoire, as performed by SFC Ernest Butler, 
a country musician and his band from Harbord Barracks. With traditional dancing, Army 
musicians guided the women’s steps away from the modern, colour-blind dance and music of 
the time, namely rock and roll. After almost a decade of U.S. military presence in France, wives 
 
55 AWC and Sally Griffith, ‘Franco-American Women’s Club: Report from Franco-American Committee’ 
(1959), 4. 
56 Micheline Deschamps, Interview with the author (8 November 2012). 
Version finale auteur – Author final draft – 2019 
 11 
of Com-Z officials had great success in influencing French wives through Brady’s 1954 public 
diplomacy programme as well as USIA’s mid-1950s ‘People’s capitalism’ campaign.57 And in 
the U.S., the Washington Times–Herald welcomed the general conclusion that the military was 
finally ‘trading boots for dancing shoes.’58 
 Its substantial administrative arsenal allowed for fast and efficient operations, attracting 
new members. In the spring of 1959, the club had as many as 156 members: eighty-seven 
American army wives and sixty-nine French women. American wives showed their habit of 
structuring the club to gain some independence. On the French side, the club was exclusively 
composed of wives of the local provincial bourgeoisie, whose spouses were in private practice 
or held higher positions in the administration. Financial dependence can explain why the club 
leaders demanded its members to uphold the highest standards of domesticity and elegance, so 
as not to jeopardize the official image of the U.S. military in France. Domesticity and good 
manners were also prerequisite conditions to receive moral and logistical support from the 
Com-Z officers’ wives’ club, whose participants were de facto members of the FAWC but also 
the target of a few advertising campaigns. In December 1958, officers’ wives received a letter 
reminding them of the War of Independence as the founding moment in French-American 
history: ‘Our men have done in the past and are doing at the present time, their share to retain 
this feeling of unity; is it not now time for us, as wives, to offer our support in this program?’59 
Later published in the Com-Z newspaper and reprinted in US Lady, a magazine printed in the 
United States and circulated on all American military bases in Asia and Europe, this letter 
brought women’s experience of the Cold War to a new discursive space. 
 
 
A MODERN DISCURSIVE SPACE: WIVES’ CLUBS, PARABELLICISM AND THE 
AMERICAN CENTURY 
 
Cold War tensions have played an integral role in shaping the notion of ‘American 
modernity’. This implies that peace and stability abroad proved less favourable for the United 
States than having to maintain peace actively, which offered the opportunity to show its material 
progress, military strength, political idealism and goodwill values.60 Born out of the tensions of 
the two world wars, the American Century incorporates the feeling of a permanent strain in 
international politics. Thus, unbeknownst to U.S. Army wives and without ever leaving the 
realm of domesticity, the implicit ‘politics of gendered interventionism’ led French women to 
grow accustomed to military matters during the Cold War. U.S. public diplomacy aimed at 
 
57 On the promotion of capitalism through public diplomacy campaigns, see: Walter L. Hixson, Parting the 
Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961 (New York, 1997), 121-50; Laura A. Belmonte, 
Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia, 2008), 50-94 and 136-58; Volker 
R. Berghahn, ‘The debate on “Americanization” among economic and cultural historians,’ Cold War History 
10:1 (2010), 107-30. 
58 ‘Military is Trading Boots for Dancing Shoes,’ Washington Times-Herald (9 December 1956), 12. 
59 FAWC, ‘Franco-American Women’s Club: An Open Letter to the Members of the Officers’ Wives’ Club’ 
(1958), 1. 
60 Thomas A. McCarthy, ‘From Modernism to Messianism: Liberal Developmentalism and American 
Exceptionalism,’ Constellations 14:1 (2007), 3-30, at 4. 
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keeping public opinion on a war footing. According to French writer Jacques Ayencourt, who 
reported on the trends in US domestic and foreign policy in the literary periodical Esprit in 
1949, U.S. public opinion was primarily ‘centred around local politics’ and largely exposed to 
the influence of the press, radio and cinema, controlled by ‘the government, who told the nation 
what to think [to not] fall back into the rut of isolationism’.61 Pushing an internationalist agenda, 
the civil-military hybridity indicates a renewed method of public diplomacy, with the US 
government deciding to ‘support, at least not discourage, press campaigns that can be described 
as parabellicist’.62 
While the idea of a ‘peacetime propaganda’ programme to keep U.S. public opinion 
alert was not a novelty, the advent of the national security state pushed the global public 
diplomacy programme to further develop what Lieutenant-Colonel Walter C. Sweeney called 
‘a nation in arms.’63 French women were of course not burdened with differentiating between 
the foreign and domestic political agendas of the United States. With their American peers, they 
produced and utilized arts and culture to their own purposes within the U.S. military base, 
favouring personal development over political issues. But external factors, such as the French 
colonial war in Algeria and the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, reduced the risk for women 
to encounter political opposition outside Com-Z. Also, the newly-elected President Charles de 
Gaulle started the first relocation operations of the U.S. Air Force in 1958.64 Consequently, 
French public opinion lost interest in the presence of US military personnel stationed on their 
territory. Public diplomacy campaigns played an important role in keeping the integrity of 
military bases safe, and U.S. Army wives in France were invited to generate positive publicity 
for the military in their local communities, to help foster the security of army personnel and 
facilities. Women’s outward political journey played a part in bringing to life this methodical 
weapon of converging national security and public diplomacy through gender-oriented 
representations. 
The burgeoning influence of non-state actors, such as the Franco-American Women’s 
Club, was instrumental to support U.S. interventionism abroad on grounds of pursuing national 
interest, as Andrew Johnstone postulates, and to promote US ascendency in the Cold War.65 
U.S. parabellicist campaigns in public diplomacy fit into the framework of the ‘consensus on 
liberal development’ in the Western world during the Cold War, and rest on the necessity for 
U.S. global hegemony and domestic affluence, but also on the stability of gender relations in 
U.S. society.66 Activities of the FAWC were often printed in local newspapers and allowed, on 
a broader scale, to counteract the effects of the general anti-American propaganda of the 
Communists. However, the political exploitation of the image of U.S. armed forces had become 
 
61 Jacques Ayencourt, ‘L’Américain, son information, la guerre et la paix,’ Esprit 18:6 (June 1949), 768-77, at 
770. 
62 Ibid., 774. 
63 Walter C. Sweeney, Military Intelligence: A New Weapon in War (New York, 1924), 61. 
64 On the issue of the end of US military bases in France, see: Pottier, Bases américaines en France, 104–15; 
Jean Heffer, ‘L’antiaméricanisme avait-il des bases économiques à l’époque gaullienne ?’ Revue Française 
d'Études Américaines 32 (1987), 319-26. 
65  Andrew Johnstone, ‘Isolationism and Internationalism in American Foreign Relations,’ Journal of 
Transatlantic Studies 9:1 (2011), 7-20, at 15. 
66 David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization & the Construction of an American World 
Order (Princeton NJ, 2011), 154. 
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a double-edged sword because the modernity espoused and promoted among others by the 
American members of the FAWC was exclusive, ostracizing all the women of Orléans from 
the local bourgeoisie.67 In the eyes of the military, any potential resentment could become a 
threat to the integrity of the U.S. armed forces, and even though no trace of official and 
unofficial reaction from the Communists or any other opposition can be found in civilian and 
military archives, it was preferable to let sleeping dogs lie. 
The FAWC continued to live in relative isolation. In March of 1959, fifty-five members 
crossed the gates of Com-Z to visit the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe 
(SHAPE), located a few kilometres outside Paris. U.S. Public diplomacy officers sought to 
publicize the club’s visit to SHAPE, since it was the first event organized outside Com-Z 
premises. According to the club’s first president, Micheline Deschamps, the event-planning 
group reached out to SHAPE’s Public Information Division. Women were welcomed and 
briefed by U.S. Army Brigadier General James O. Curtis, who explained the ins and outs of the 
organization. As was customary since Gruenther’s tenure as Supreme Allied Commander, the 
SHAPE Public Information officer (PIO) had a photograph taken with all fifty-five women after 
closing proceedings. Taken by the SHAPE press office, several copies of the photograph were 
sent to regional newspapers, to which was attached a press release. On April 18, 1959, the 
République du Centre published a piece on the FAWC's visit to SHAPE. The caption was: ‘Last 
Tuesday, the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe welcomed the Orléans 
Franco-American Women's Club in Rocquencourt. After visiting the facilities of the Supreme 
Command of the Allied Armies of the Atlantic Pact, members of the Club were invited for a 
tea by Mrs. Houghton, wife of the US Ambassador.’68 No matter how short or elaborate, all 
relevant activities around the SHAPE headquarters were chosen for press campaigns, targeting 
the French population by exposing a form of modernity generated by this community of 
transnational women, and legitimized by the following visit to the US embassy in Paris. The 
military set out to micromanage its image around the region, with women who not only read 
about the news, but actually made it, to paraphrase Le Sueur. 
The parabellicist strategy also shifted the club’s raison d’être to the pages of popular 
magazines, highlighting the link between women, public diplomacy and the American Century. 
Despite its status as ‘a unique initiative with no formal link at any level,’69 the FAWC of Orléans 
was given credit, in the March 1965 issue of the widely-read US Lady magazine, for its activism 
on French-American relations: 
 
The Franco-American Women's Club meets regularly at Chateau La Mothe. Striving for a closer 
relationship between French and American women, this fine organization conducts a number of 
money-raising auctions and bazaars to provide funds for two scholarships awarded annually to 
French students. In addition, it sponsors lectures on area specialties, travel tips and cooking. 
Members have pooled their culinary know-how and published a cookbook of favourite recipes.70 
 
 
67 Axelle Bergeret-Cassagne, Les bases américaines en France: Impacts matériels et culturels, 1950-1967 (Paris, 
2009), 199-227. 
68 ‘Le Club Féminin Franco-Américain d’Orléans a visité le SHAPE,’ La République du Centre (18 April 1959). 
69 Micheline Deschamps, Interview (November 8, 2012). 
70 Pearl Fuchs, ‘Post of the Month--Orleans, France,’ US Lady 9:10 (March 1965), 20. 
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According to the author Major Pearl Fuchs, the FAWC had been particularly active in the area 
of ‘cuisine diplomacy,’ a very conventional but popular activity maintaining women in their 
traditional role as wives and mothers.71 Moreover, the U.S. Army championed their 
domesticity: ‘What to do with the baby while you are engaged in all these activities? A post 
nursery is available at Coligny Caserne, [but] other service wives and American teenagers also 
do babysitting, or your wonderful husband may permit you to have a French maid.’72 It is also 
interesting to note that US Lady, a magazine published in the United States to address issues of 
American women exclusively, in its pages gave priority to the FAWC of Orléans over long-
established American clubs such as the Medical Services Wives, the Ordnance Wives and the 
Engineer Wives, or even the popular Non-Commissioned Officers’ Wives Club. It shows, in a 
nutshell, that the FAWC went beyond encouraging the traditional role of women: they heralded 
the liberal consensus, at a time when the mainstream press in the U.S. was antagonizing French 
and American women.73 
Ultimately, women’s clubs on U.S. military bases emerged as yet a new discursive 
space, where the expression of freedom and independence not only colluded with traditional 
gender roles, but also sustained the ambivalent message of U.S. national security at home and 
abroad, a message carried methodically to the public through the slogan of the American 
Century. This new discourse, introduced by the hybrid civil-military Cold War public 
diplomacy of the United States, was imbued with modernity, asserting the strength of the 
French-American military alliance to underline the importance to preserve NATO in troubled 
times. At the time of de Gaulle’s removal of US military bases from the French territory, the 
Franco-American Women’s Club played a key role in strengthening and expanding the links 
between transatlantic elite classes. Indeed, after six years spent as honorary president of the 
FAWC, Micheline Deschamps started the first Lyceum Club in France in 1967, an international 
association of Anglo-American influence helping women promote peace, freedom, 
independence and self-enterprise.74 But just as many former members of the FAWC joined the 
Lyceum Club in Orléans, U.S. Army wives left France and were relocated to Germany. Without 
their French partners, American women could no longer uphold the image of the American 
Century, which would affect the memory of the U.S. military presence in France in the 
following decades. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It can be discussed whether the prompt departure of U.S. soldiers was the moment that 
transformed women’s experience toward modernity. Women’s active role in propagating 
American values abroad coincided with the rise of imperialism at the turn of the twentieth 
 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Toni Howard, ‘The Women of America and France,’ The Saturday Evening Post (18 February 1961), 18-19, 
60-63. 
74 On the question of the Lyceum, see: Angela G. Ray, The Lyceum and Public Culture in the Nineteenth-
Century United States (East Lansing, 2005); Sarah Leggott, ‘The Female Intellectual in 1920s Madrid: Writing 
the Lyceum Club,’ AUMLA 110 (2008), 95-112. 
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century and continued well into the Cold War. Faced with the onerous challenge to build public 
support for troops, women contributed to the projection of a streamlined image of the American 
armed forces on foreign territory. Meanwhile, press moguls projected America’s military might 
in the name of national security, to garner full consent from U.S. public opinion and condone 
internationalism. The U.S. government was determined to revive the ‘cultural and political 
connection between the “cradle” and the “torch-bearer” of Western modernity,’ in which 
military families played an active role throughout the Cold War.75 The latter promoted a 
‘modernisation shock’ that did not sit well, because of its constructed nature, with part of the 
French population during the Cold War.76 
U.S. Army wives pursued a domestic agenda, in so far as they worked within the regular 
channels of civilian and military diplomacy to uphold traditional values on and around military 
bases in France. In that sense, the ‘modernization’ pattern advocated in U.S. public diplomacy 
discourse, which elevated social engineering onto an equal footing with foreign policy 
decisions, was absorbed by the military tradition of preserving domestic security, as underlined 
in Luce’s formulation of the ‘American Century’. While the French-American Women’s Club 
of Orléans was certainly an innovative yet traditional operation, fostering good relations 
between the women of both countries, it also acted as a conveyor belt and set forth a façade of 
modernity that heralded the Atlantic community and secured France’s position in the Western 
world. After France left NATO’s integrated military command in 1966,77 a new discourse 
emerged, not only on otherness, but also on women’s clubs and military bases as examples of 
‘heterotopia’ or ‘other spaces’, as Michel Foucault theorized, resulting from the success of the 
American Century.78 
 
 
75 Alessandro Brogi, ‘Ending Grand Alliance Politics in Western Europe: US Anti-Communism in France and 
Italy, 1944–7,’ Journal of Contemporary History 53:1 (2018), 134–57. 
76 Mireille Conia, ‘Les bases américaines sur le territoire français. Une illustration de la Guerre froide,’ P. Buton, 
O. Büttner, M. Hastings (eds), in La Guerre froide vue d'en bas (Paris, 2014), 151-66. 
77 On de Gaulle and the removal of bases, see: Jean Charpentier, ‘Le retrait français de l’OTAN,’ Annuaire 
français de droit international 12 (1966), 409-33, at 410; Andreas Wenger, ‘Crisis and Opportunity: NATO's 
Transformation and the Multilateralization of Detente, 1966-1968,’ Journal of Cold War Studies 6:1 (2004), 22-
74; James Ellison, ‘Defeating the General: Anglo-American Relations, Europe and the NATO Crisis of 1966,’ 
Cold War History 6:1 (2006), 85-111; Benjamin Varat, ‘Point of Departure: A Reassessment of Charles de 
Gaulle and the Paris Summit of May 1960,’ Diplomacy and Statecraft 19:1 (2008), 96-124; Garrett Martin, 
‘General de Gaulle’s Challenge to the Atlantic Community, 1958-69,’ G.  Scott-Smith and V. Aubourg 
(eds), Atlantic, Euratlantic or Europe-America? (Paris, 2011), 84‑103. 
78 Michel Foucault, ‘Des espaces autres’ (conference talk at the Cercle d'études architecturales, 14 March 1967), 
Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité 5 (October 1984), 46-9. 
